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Abstract 
Liberal peacebuilding has received a considerable amount of criticism in the recent 
peacebuilding and state building literature. Critics of the liberal approach argue that electoral 
democracy is a foreign-imposed institution, which often does not enjoy public acceptance and 
legitimacy as local institutions do. Post-conflict Sierra Leone has undergone a similar struggle 
when the Local Government Act was introduced in 2004. Under the new law, much power 
enjoyed by chiefs was transferred to the elected local councillors. While traditional chiefdom 
governance was blamed to be one of the institutional drivers of the civil war, this customary 
authority is highly respected and the reform was resisted by many local people. Nevertheless, 
the new system produces some positive development outcomes and the country has remained 
largely peaceful. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the channels through which 
trust in a poorly trusted government body can be developed. Based on survey data from Sierra 
Leone, my statistical analysis examines three mechanisms through which political trust can be 
built: improved public services, clean administration, and responsive governance. It is found 
that local governments which are willing to listen and respond to their people are more likely 
to be trusted by the public. 
 
Keywords: Political Trust, Decentralisation, Corruption, Public Goods, Sierra Leone 
JEL Classifications: D73, H11, H41  
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Introduction 
The concept of trust is fundamental to the field of peace research. The concept is 
embedded in the classical theories of war and conflict resolution. For example, the security 
dilemma model depicts a strategic environment in which, out of fear, actors keep arming 
themselves, thus creating an increasingly insecure environment (Jervis, 1978). Conceivably, if 
the logic of rationality can be harnessed by the positive attitude of trust, the actors may be 
able to achieve a more cooperative outcome. In fact, in the democratic peace literature, 
democracies are reasoned to be less likely to engage in war with other democracies because 
they believe that other democracies are bounded by the normative guidelines and more likely 
to seek peaceful settlements before full escalation when a conflict arises (Dixon, 1994). In the 
case of civil war settlement, Walter (1997: 337) notes that because trust could be exploited by 
the opponent in a security dilemma, the potential for exploitation creates a critical barrier to 
civil war settlement. As another example, in the bargaining model of war (Fearon, 1995), trust 
is regarded as a precondition of peace because establishing trustworthiness and credibility is 
an essential way to solve the commitment problem (Walter, 1999). The lack of trust among 
belligerents also explains why third-party involvement is conducive to peace (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild, 2001). As the chance of misinterpreting the 
intentions of other parties is reduced when accidents or skirmishes occur, peace is more likely 
to be sustained and less likely to be spoiled when a third party is present (Fortna, 2008). 
Not only in conflict onset and settlement, trust is also proved to be crucial in a peace 
process. If one of the conflicting parties in negotiation does not believe that its opponents 
have some chances of honouring the agreement, an agreement will not be reached in the first 
place. Even if an agreement is reached, violence would be easily resumed when there is a 
lacking of trust. For instance, spoilers may manipulate the uncertainty plagued in the tensional 
environment and restore the state of conflict from which they can benefit; for example, in a 
war economy (e.g. Keen, 1998). However, as Kydd and Walter (2002, 2006: 72-76) show, 
spoilers’ ability to sabotage peace hinges on the degree of trust that the signatories have on 
the other party when a new series of attacks are observed.  
Though essential, the topic attracts only limited attention. There is a substantial 
amount of research on generalised or social trust, defined as trust in people whom one does 
not know. Yet, the primary concern in that literature is generalised trust, not trust in 
government. The latter concept, also called political trust, is the topic that this paper focuses 
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on. Focusing on political trust, De Juan & Pierskalla, (2014) show that exposure to violence in 
civil wars undermines citizen’s trust in government. However, we still know little about how 
one can repair political trust effectively after civil wars. There are some usual candidate 
factors, for example, accountable and effective governance, but we do not know to what 
extent these measures really deliver the effect as promised. The study by Hutchison and 
Johnson (2011) devotes to the topic of political trust in Africa. Their cross-country analysis, 
however, is not situated in the post-conflict context. In fact, most of the countries in their 
sample did not experience civil war shortly before the sampling period. Therefore, their 
findings are better at addressing the question of how political trust affects the likelihood of 
conflict rather than how political trust could be built after large scale violence. Other 
contributions that relate trust and conflict include Cuesta & Alda (2012) and Höglund & 
Svensson (2006), but their primary interests are victimisation in conflict and mistrust in 
negotiation instead of trust-building after civil wars, a topic that this paper aims to contribute.  
This paper will proceed as the following. I will first briefly discuss the concept of trust 
in the literature, then move on to discuss three mechanisms through which political trust could 
be enhanced. Afterward, I will provide some details on the institutional reform in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone. The post-conflict decentralisation reform in Sierra Leone faced a legitimacy 
crisis when a new level of government was introduced to replace the existing customary 
authority, which had governed the majority of population since colonisation. Against this 
backdrop, the case of Sierra Leone provides a unique opportunity to answer the question of 
how political trust in the newly existed institution is shaped in a post-conflict setting. More 
specific hypotheses and further details on research design will then be provided before turning 
to results and conclusion.  
 
Building Political Trust 
Galtung (1964) refers positive peace to the ‘integration of human society’ (Galtung, 
1964: 2) and ‘cooperation’ (Galtung, 1969: 190).1 Trust is a main component of social capital, 
a necessary condition of social integration, which helps sustain civil society and associations, 
and maintains peace and social stability (Newton, 2001: 201-202). Trust could be a rational 
                                                            
1 Galtung (1969) later revises his definition of positive peace. He refers it as the absence of structural violence 
(p. 183 and endnote 31) and defines the notion in terms of social justice. 
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concept and is embedded in the logic of interests (Hardin, 2006; Hoffman, 2002).2 This is 
because, contrary to what most people think, trust is not unconditional as it involves 
expectations, the expectations that the trustees would honour particular obligations. Without 
the uncertainty associated with the expectation, trust involves no risks and becomes 
something trivial. Therefore from the social intelligence perspective, trust can be about the 
ability to ‘detect and process signs of risks in social interactions’ (Yamagishi, 2001: 126; 
Lewis & Weigert 1985: 970). The ability offers incentives to be trustworthy, and it is 
trustworthiness that provides the base of social cooperation (Deutsch, 1957; Nannestad, 2008: 
414-415). Experimental economics literature provides such evidence and shows that trust 
could be calculative and based on the expectation of trustworthiness (Ashraf, Bohnet, & 
Piankov, 2006).3 In short, trust is based on both rationality and expectation.  
In this light, political trust can be defined as an evaluative orientation toward the 
government based on ‘how well the government is operating according to people's normative 
expectations’ (Hetherington, 1998: 791). As people form expectation based on the 
performance and functioning of a political system, these expectations also determine people’s 
perception on the legitimacy of the political regime. Given the tie between political trust and 
legitimacy, political trust could be evaluated based three elements of a political system 
pertaining to legitimacy: the input and the output sides (Rothstein, 2009) and the principle that 
the government follows when performing its functions (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008).  
Considering the input side, democracy has been praised for its advantage of holding a 
government more accountable than other political systems. Under the pressure of being 
elected, politicians are more likely to be responsive to the demand of their voters. The support 
from the population, through the link of elections, gains an elected government acceptance 
and legitimacy. Even though only the interests of the majority could be represented, 
procedural fairness of the election system grants the elected government certain level of 
legitimacy, provided that fragmentation is not severe in the society, such that everyone stands 
a fair chance of becoming majority (Rothstein, 2009: 313). Moreover, participation and 
deliberation in the policy process could be essential to a state to be viewed as legitimate 
(Carroll & Carroll, 1999; Rothstein, 2009: 323). With a voice and influence in the process of 
                                                            
2 There are more than one way to define trust. For example, trust could also be norm‐based; see Nannestad 
(2008). 
3 In fact, the ability of detecting risks plays a similar theoretical function to the ability to punish deviation in the 
repeated game framework. See Carpenter, Daniere & Takahashi (2004) for experimental evidence for the use of 
disapproval of free riding in maintaining cooperation. 
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formulating policy, the public feel that their interests are respected and protected. Another 
aspect is about policy influence: to what extent people can influence the policy choice of the 
government? Policy choice means not only how much public service should be provided but 
also how public resources are allocated. In general, if the people perceive that the tax rate is 
reasonable and the taxes are levied for what they desire, the expectations of people are better 
met, and the less likely the people think that the government is taking advantage from them 
and a higher level of trust in government will result. The respect to citizen’s preference 
renders legitimacy to the government from the input side of the system.  
Rothstein (2009), nevertheless, argues that legitimacy is created, maintained and 
destroyed by the output of a political system. While people do care about norms and values, 
they also care about the quality of life, which in many ways are reflected by the quality of 
such public goods as security and healthcare provided by the government. A government is 
legitimate if it can prove itself effective in fulfilling its basic function as expected by its 
citizen by justifying its existence. Many empirical analyses show that deterioration of well-
being is a strong predictor of regime change and civil war, exemplars of legitimacy crisis, 
considering that the state is the final guarantor of the living of the poor (Haggard & Kaufman, 
1995; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Teorell, 2010). In fact, this idea of effective governance is 
reflected in the recent shift in state building strategy of the US government (Lake, 2010). In 
his analysis on the trend of US state building practice, Lake notes that there is a paradigmatic 
shift from emphasising on democratisation to paying equal attention to public services and the 
basic needs of the people. Legitimacy flows not only from the building of a representative 
government but also from the extents that a government fulfils the social contract 
satisfactorily.  
Finally, corruption erodes political legitimacy. Corruption occurs when government 
officials give preferential treatments to bribers by exchanging their public power for private 
gains. From an economic point of view, as voluntary exchange implies increases in utilities 
hence economic welfares, corruption could be a way of realising economic benefits hence 
greases of wheels. On the other hand, it generates social costs. Mauro (1995) find that 
corruption causes a lower level of investment and a lower rate of economic growth. More 
importantly, the exchange violates the principle of impartiality that is often associated with 
the notion of legitimacy (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Rothstein, 2009). Corruption violates the 
principle because the exchange harms and ignores the interests and rights of other people in 
the society at the same time, thus violating the social contract that renders legitimacy to the 
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government. Even though the general economic welfare may sometimes improve in the short 
run, it is also an abuse of public power. In the case of public goods provision, the impartiality 
principle is violated when the person who has connection or pays bribery receives preferential 
treatments from the official. For example, people who refuse to pay bribery may be denied 
access to or offered inferior public services like education or healthcare to which they are 
entitled. The connection between corruption and legitimacy becomes salient in the case of 
access to justice. By favouring one side of a lawsuit, the government fails to be a neutral 
arbitrator, a role assigned to public authority in case of dispute. The same also holds when the 
police do not enforce the law by prosecuting suspects who pay bribes. In all three examples, 
the government breaches the social contract. Despite of the short-term individual material 
benefits, as social order and justice are failed to be upheld, social costs outweigh social 
benefits. As corruption harms people’s interests and exploits people’s rights, a lower level of 
political trust is resulted.  
 All in all, the section provides a three-way framework in analysing political trust at a 
general level. However, before stating the hypotheses, in the following, I will first introduce 
the background information on the institutional reform in post-conflict Sierra Leone and 
highlight the relevance of political trust in the case. Afterward, I will state the hypotheses by 
referring them to the context of the case. 
 
Decentralisation and Trust in New Political Institution in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone 
 Although the urbanised Freetown was a hotspot of violence in the Sierra Leone Civil 
War (1991-2002), much of the violence and fights were conducted in rural areas and involved 
rural youth (Richards, 2005; Truth & Reconciliation Commission, 2004: 94-96). The role of 
resources, especially diamonds, played in the conflict may give an impression that the war is a 
product of greed but not grievance, however, qualitative studies reveal that local institution 
has a significant role to play in the escalation process.  
 Historically, chiefs in Sierra Leone had been associated with slavery since at least the 
nineteenth century (Richards, 2005). Local chiefs had immense power in commanding the use 
of labours under their chiefdoms. For example, they could mobilise people fight in wars, trade 
people within regions as slaves, and put people to work in subsistence economy. Under the 
polygyny system, they often force women to perform housework, farming, sexual and 
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reproductive services in exchange for labours, clients, and political alliances. They made 
favoured slaves became clients and the territory was governed through the system of 
clientelism.   
The same system was preserved and maintained later under the British indirect rule 
after colonisation. Except for the Colony (i.e. Freetown and nowadays Western Areas), 
chiefdoms in the Northern, Eastern and Southern provinces nowadays were made 
Protectorate. Under indirect rule, chiefs were appointed by the British governor to maintain 
the ‘customary’ order without close monitoring. Chiefs, however, were also granted new 
rights by the British. For instance, chiefs could demand unpaid community work from people 
under their rule. Though domestic slavery was abolished in 1927 in Sierra Leone, polygyny 
and customary powers related to taxation, marriage, community works, and dispute settlement 
made servitude has continued to be part of rural life. It was this unequal power relation which 
eventually drove young people to rebel and the country to war. At the micro-level, the civil 
war is a ‘slave revolt’ with a deep root in local institutions (Richards, 2005: 586). There is 
evidence behind this claim. For example, Jackson (2005: 51) observes that local government 
buildings were targeted by the RUF, and Bellows & Miguel, (2006: 394) note that chiefs were 
targeted for massacres during the civil war. 
 After independence in 1961, elected local councils were installed. But the institution 
was abolished by the then president Siaka Stevens for the purpose of centralising and 
consolidating his authoritarian rule (Srivastava & Larizza, 2011: 142-143). Local councils 
were abolished in 1972 and their power and resources were centralised in Freetown, and the 
institution was superseded by management committees, which was staffed by regime 
supporters. All these changes made traditional chieftaincy the only available form of 
governance in a large part of the country. This situation had remained unchanged till 2004 
when a decentralisation reform re-created the institution of local council. Under the Local 
Government Act (2004), the local council becomes a higher administrative unit and political 
authority than chieftaincy. The new institution has the legal rights to set tax rate, oversee tax 
collection, approve chiefdom council budgets, and amend customary by-laws that impede its 
legal authority. Various decision-making powers previously granted to chiefs are now handed 
over to local councils. The reform, nevertheless, retains the chieftaincy system. Local chiefs 
keep performing certain administration functions such as collection of revenue, maintenance 
of social orders, and determination of customary rights related to land-use and native status 
(Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2005; Labonte, 2011; Srivastava & Larizza, 2011). 
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 Although frustration and resentment towards chiefs are abounding and chieftaincy was 
perceived as an instrument of exploitation, democratic decentralisation, which was proposed 
and advertised as a solution to address the root cause of the conflict, is not widely accepted 
and is perceived as illegitimate. Lots of local people still value customary authority and 
consider the new layer of government an extension of Freetown’s bureaucratic abuse of power 
(Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2006; Sawyer, 2008). Furthermore, the new system is perceived to 
be associated with corruption, illegal jurisprudence, and metropolitan elite interference in 
chiefdom affairs (Fanthorpe, 2005: 39). According to Fanthorpe (2005), legitimacy plays a 
central role behind the resistance; for example, local landowners expressed bitterness about 
having union leaders and traders that have non-local origin ahead of them (Fanthorpe, 2005: 
38). The ideas of ‘sons of the soil’, ‘strangers’, ‘external’, ‘non-local’, ‘rival chiefly family’ 
pervade in the analysis by Fanthorpe. 
 The case of Sierra Leone is particularly interesting and relevant given by the mistrust 
to the new system described above. On one hand, decentralisation has the potential to correct 
institutional violence that was found to induce grievances and violence. On the other hand, the 
proposed solution is perceived to be against local tradition hence illegitimate. Given the 
fragility of peace in a post-conflict environment, how could trust in government be generated? 
How can we explain the variation in the levels of trust between the new and old institution? 
Which trust-building mechanisms which are discussed in previous section are more relevant?  
Various international aid providers such as the World Bank and UNDP adopts a liberal 
approach and considers that a democratic local government could improve accountability 
hence economic outcomes (Casey, Glennerster & Miguel, 2014; Fanthorpe, 2005). In general, 
they believe that political participation provides a mechanism through which good governance 
would be promoted. When accountability generates legitimacy, political trust could be 
enhanced (Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Roberts 2008). In the case of Sierra Leone, under the 
traditional chieftaincy rule, the demands of the people were usually ignored, and elite capture 
is found associated with worse development outcomes (Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson, 2014). 
Consider that a higher level of policy influence could enhance political trust, as is discussed in 
the previous section, we have the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Trust in government increases when the local people perceive that they 
have a higher level of policy influence in the policy making process. 
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The new government has the major tasks of reconstructing the post-conflict society. 
Not surprisingly, the local people would assess the performance of the new government based 
on the overall quality change of the public services provided. If the performance of 
government is a key determinant of political trust, one would expect to observe the following 
empirical relationship. 
Hypothesis 2: Trust in local government increases when public goods provision is 
improved. 
Finally, the context of the Sierra Leone conflict illustrated that the chiefs are often 
perceived as corrupted and exploitative. At the same time, some local people consider the new 
system as a new form of abusive governance. However, if political trust is negatively related 
to the level of corruption, people are more likely to have a higher level of trust to the less 
corrupted officials.   
Hypothesis 3: Local people have a higher level of political trust in the new institution 
if it is perceived to be less corrupted than the chiefs. 
The rest of the article will test these three hypotheses based on data from Sierra Leone. 
Though the findings are likely to be context-specific and may not be generalisable, as long as 
political trust depends on institution rather than culture, as what Mushler and Rose (2001) 
found, the findings in this study could inform policymakers which types of policy could 
generate political trust more effectively than the others in a post-conflict situation.  
 
Research Design  
Except for data on the variables resources and ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ELF), 
all data are from the 2005 and 2007 National Public Services (NPS) surveys conducted by the 
Evaluations Unit of the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) 
administrated by the Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank. NPS is a nationally 
representative survey. The country was stratified by 19 local councils. Each council was then 
proportionally divided into smaller enumeration areas (EAs) according to the estimated 
population living in that area.4 In each EA, 10 households were selected randomly from the 
census list. The final sample included 6,345 households in 635 enumeration areas. Since 
                                                            
4 However, the smallest Local Council area, Bonthe City, was over-sampled and one EA in Bo district was not 
located in the 2007 survey. 
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people in Freetown and the Western Areas have been ruled by elected local governments, the 
reform mainly affects people living in the Northern, Southern, and Eastern Provinces. Ideally, 
one may wish to compare the responses from people from the Colony and from other part of 
the country. Unfortunately, questions that help us to code our key variables hence identify the 
causal effects were not covered in case the respondents were from Freetown and the Western 
Areas. For this reason, I include only respondents from the three provinces in the data set. To 
ensure accuracy of the results, I also exclude observations which the interviewers considered 
that (1) they did not have confidence in the overall truthfulness of the responses; (2) the 
respondents had serious problems speaking or understanding the interviewers; and (3) the 
respondents felt uncomfortable to answer some of the questions because someone else was 
present during the interviews.  
 
Model and Identification Strategy 
The investigation has three stages. In the first stage, I focus on the determinants of 
political trust towards local councillor in 2007. The dependent variable is coded based on the 
response to the following question in the survey: In your opinion, do you believe local 
councillors or do you have to be careful dealing with them. The trust variable is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the respondent indicated that local councillors could be believed. 
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, the logit model was used in this 
stage of the analysis. The multilevel logistic regression was also used given the hierarchical 
structure of the data. Different households in the same locality are governed by the same 
chief, and different chiefs in the same region are governed by the same local councillors. As 
individuals are influenced by the same contextual factors, observations in the same unit are 
not completely independent. If dependence is strong, the usual logit model would lead to 
smaller standard errors hence misleading results (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). In this case, 
the multilevel model, which is able to correct for the dependence, as well as unobserved 
heterogeneity, becomes a better choice. In our case, both two-level (household and chiefdom) 
and three-level models (household, chiefdom, and local council) fit the context well. To 
determine which model is superior, I selected models based on the likelihood ratio test. 
Nevertheless, as I will show later, my main findings are not sensitive to the choice about the 
number of levels. 
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Results from the first stage only tell us what determinants are correlated with trust in 
the new institution after reform, but a similar set of determinants could explain trust in the old 
institution as well. As a more policy-relevant question is that what makes people trust the 
much disliked new institution more than the highly respected traditional authority after three 
years of the reform, the case of Sierra Leone is particularly relevant given by its reform 
context, a context that I exploit to provide a more specific answer to the research question 
otherwise cannot be obtained with data from a random country. In the second stage, the 
dependent variable is the differential in the level of trust between two governing bodies. To 
code the variable, I compare the responses (from the same individual) to the previously stated 
survey question that corresponds to chiefdom officials (COs) and local councillors (LCs). 
More specifically, the dependent variable is an ordinal variable with four categories: (4) LCs 
can be believed but have to be careful dealing with COs; (3) both LCs and COs can be 
believed; (2) have to be careful dealing with both LCs and COs; (1) COs can be believed but 
have to be careful dealing with LCs. The coding rule assumes that if the respondent can 
believe one party but thinks that has to be careful dealing with the other, the respondent is 
considered to trust one party more than the other. Given the ordinal nature of the variable, the 
ordinal logit model was used. Similarly, given the hierarchical structure of the data, the 
multilevel ordinal logistic model was employed.  
The final stage of my investigation is a difference-in-difference analysis. In this case, 
the overtime changes in the level of trust towards chiefs are taken away from that towards 
local councils. By differencing the relevant dependent variables and independent variables 
across institution and time, the method improves the quality of my inferences and better 
captures the causal effects of the independent variables. However, because the question 
related to trust in chiefs and the questions related to perception of corruption were not 
contained in the 2005 survey, the difference-in-difference design is imperfect. The accuracy 
of the results would be based on the assumptions that the reform had minimal impact on 
people’s perception on chiefs, such that both trust in chiefs and perception on the level of 
corruption of chiefs were held constant across times; however, these assumptions may or may 
not hold. 
 
Variables 
To test the hypotheses, I include the following three independent variables. 
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Corrupt: A question in the NPS survey asks: If the local council was given 500 
million Leones to complete a project in this area, do you believe that he / she would spend all 
the money doing a good job on the project or would he / she cut some of the money? The 
variable is the an ordinal variable with four categories: (1) spend all the money; (2) cut a little 
money; (3) cut most of the money; (4) take all the money. There is a similar question about 
the behaviours of paramount chief. For the second stage of the analysis, I use a new variable, 
kCorrupt, which is equal to the difference between two responses. Given that our interest is 
trust in the local council, I take the perception of the chief as the baseline. Consequently, a 
high value of the kCorrupt variable implies that the respondent considered that the local 
council was cleaner than the chief. The same variable kCorrupt was used again in the third 
stage as the 2005 survey does not contain a similar question for valid comparison.5 
Voice: To evaluate what the people think about their influence in the making of local 
policy, I rely on the following question in the NPS survey: Do you think the local council 
listens to what people in this town / neighbourhood say or what they need? This independent 
variable is a dummy variable equal to one when the respondent considered that people’s 
opinions are being valued in the process. There is a similar question about the behaviours of 
paramount chief. For the second stage of the analysis, I use a new variable, kVoice, which is 
equal to the difference between two responses. Given that our interest is trust in the local 
council, I take the perception of the chief as the baseline. Consequently, a high value of the 
kVoice variable implies that the respondent considered that the local council was more 
responsive to people’s voices than the chief did. In the final stage of the analysis, the variable 
ktVoice was used. It is equal to the differences in kVoice across time. A higher value of 
ktVoice denotes a more responsive local council with respect to a chief. 
Public goods: There is more than one dimension about public goods provision; for 
example, quantity, accessibility, quality, affordability, etc. Given data limitation, in this 
analysis I can only evaluate one aspect: accessibility, which is measured in terms of the 
walking time that the respondent used to take to reach the nearest facilities. Although walking 
is the prevailing mode, in some cases, respondents would use bicycle or take public transport 
to the nearest facilities. But to standardise access time and to avoid inconsistency that was due 
                                                            
5  The  seemingly  similar  question  (F15)  in  the  2005  survey  is  rather  ambiguous.  It  is  asking  about  the 
effectiveness of using the funds instead of the perception on corruption. 
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to switching transportation modes, I created the index by only making use of the observations 
with the walking time information available.  
The composite index of public goods provision is an unweight sum of the indices of 
three public goods (healthcare, road, and water) minus the sum of the indices of the other two 
(education and markets). I put a minus for two reasons. First, market is an area which the 
chiefs are held responsible (Foster & Glennester, 2009: 77). Second, although education is 
part of the reform, unlike the other sectors, education did not start devolving until 2007, the 
time when the survey was conducted (Foster & Glennester, 2009: 77). This composite 
indicator should probably be read with a grain of salt because the use of the minus operator 
rests on the assumption that local people were well aware of the differences. To ameliorate 
possible bias because of the assumption implied by the aggregation, same analyses were also 
performed using separate variables. Therefore, both the sign and magnitude of the estimates 
are remained flexible.  
Five facilities are considered: motorable road, health facility/ provider, safe drinking 
water, primary schools, and markets. Given the design of the questionnaire, the responses 
could only fall into one of the following categories, which time intervals are unevenly 
distributed: (1) less than 15 minutes; (2) 15 to 30 minutes; (3) 30 minutes to one hour; (4) 
between one and two hours; (5) over two hours. Therefore, a high value of the index means 
that a service was less accessible. For the second stage of the analysis, I use a new variable, 
tPublic goods, which is equal to the differences of responses across two years: 2005 and 
2007. Note that in this case, a high value of the variable indicates that the public services were 
more accessible across times. Given the context related to the devolution of education and 
markets which I discussed above, one can read the variable tPublic goods as ktPublic 
goods, because the minus operator performs the required differencing.  
Based on the context of the conflict, I also include the following control variables in 
the analysis.  
Age: A high proportion (37%) of combatants in the Sierra Leone civil war was school 
pupils (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008: 454). If the traditional governance system is a major 
cause of the conflict, a cause that motivates rural youth to pick up arms to fight, as the major 
victim of the system (Richards, 2005), young people should be more likely to trust the new 
institution.   
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Gender: Though there are some female paramount chiefs (Jackson, 2005: 105), 
women are frequently subjected to mistreat and abuses (Fanthorpe, 2005). The new Local 
Government Act enhances women’s participation in the decision making process in the new 
government institution. For example, the Local Government Service Commission is 
comprised of eight persons: a chairman, three representatives, and four members. The new 
Act requires that among those four members, at least three of them must be women. Similarly, 
in the Ward Committee, the number of members is restricted to be a maximum of ten. Among 
them, at least five must be women. Given the changes, women may have a higher level of 
trust in the new system than the old one. 
Migrant: Chiefs have the authority to grant ‘native status’ to individuals who live in 
their chiefdoms. These rights, for example, include residential, land-use, political, legal, and 
social rights (Labonte, 2011: 99). Rarely granted, these rights in many ways adversely 
influence the livelihood of individual, especially migrants who were not born in the chiefdom 
that they reside. For instance, chiefs have the power to prohibit a transaction of land to 
migrants (Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson, 2014: 327). Consequently, migrants are more likely 
to have a low level of trust in the customary system. The variable is coded as equal to one 
when respondents lived in chiefdoms different from where they were born. 
Victimisation: De Juan and Pierskalla (2014) found that exposure to civil war violence 
reduces one’s political trust. This count measure captures exposure by counting the number of 
the following experience that the respondents encountered during the conflict: members of 
their households were injured or maimed; members of their households were killed; their 
houses were burned down; members of their households fled the community; members of 
their households made refugee to other countries.  
Assets:  The variable measures the economic standing of the respondents. Since there 
are no income data, I construct the measure by counting the number of following items owned 
by the household of the respondents: generator, car/truck/motorcycle, TV, bicycle, mobile 
phone, electric fan, radio/radio cassette player. In a sensitivity analysis, I further separate 
them into two categories: luxury goods (generator, car/truck/motorcycle, TV) and usual goods 
(the rest).   
ELF: Ethnic diversity may undermine public goods provision because collective 
action is more likely to be sustained in an ethnically more homogeneous environment through 
a denser social network hence stronger social enforcement (Habyarimana et al., 2007). If the 
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relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision is strong, failing to include 
the variable may cause endogeneity bias. Though a recent study by Glennerster, Miguel and 
Rothenberg (2013) found that ethnic diversity does not hamper public goods provision in the 
case of Sierra Leone, to minimise the risk, the variable is included in the analysis. The index 
is a Herfindahl index, which is equal to the probability that two individuals randomly selected 
in a chieftaincy belong to different ethnic groups. Data are from Glennerster, Miguel and 
Rothenberg (2013). 
Diamond: According to the customary authority, chiefs are eligible for direct 
payments of rents for mining activities in their chiefdoms (Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson, 
2014: 327). For instance, chiefs are entitled to one-quarter of the 3% tax collected at the 
centre as development funds for the chiefdom. However, because accountability mechanism is 
close to non-existence, local people often complain that the funds are appropriated by the 
chiefs rather than used for development (Jackson, 2006: 100). Not surprisingly, people who 
live in chiefdom with richer diamond deposits suffer more welfare loss and have less political 
trust in the chiefdom system. This variable measures the number of diamond mines in a 
chieftaincy. Data are from Bellows & Miguel (2009). 
 
Results 
The main findings are summarised in Table I, full statistical tables, as well as the 
model specification stated in column (1) in Table I, are subsumed in the Appendix. Here I 
only provide brief comments on them. First, models with or without the multilevel 
specification give very similar results. The consistency also holds between the results from 
the two-level and three-level models. Furthermore, though most of the coefficients of the 
control variable are short of statistical significance, most of the time they do carry the 
expected signs, and this always holds when the estimates are statistically significant. These 
consistency, stability, and expectancy enhance one’s confidence in the trustworthiness of the 
findings. In the following, I will limit my discussion to the main findings pertaining to the 
hypotheses. Table I presents the estimates of relevant variables in odds ratio.  
[Table I here] 
Regarding the determinants of trust in the new institution in 2007 (see the first two 
rows in Table I), only the estimates of the coefficient of the corruption and voice variables are 
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statistically significant. Though a reduction in access time overall improves the level of trust 
in the new institution, the estimate of the coefficient of the public goods variable is not 
statistically significant at 10% level. Its substantive effect is also found to be negligible. When 
time to access for one of the services jumps from one interval to the next higher interval, the 
odds of an individual changing his or her attitude from distrusting to trusting in the new 
institution are only about 0.4% lower on average. In contrast, the odds are 23% lower if a 
local council is perceived to be more corrupted (i.e. moving from one category to the next less 
well-regarded category) and 112% higher if a local council is perceived to be willing to listen 
to the people from their constituencies (i.e. moving from one category to the next higher 
regarded category). Similar findings hold when we disaggregated the public goods index into 
its individual components. Less accessible healthcare services on average reduce political 
trust by a moderate 9%. On the other hand, estimates of the coefficients corresponding to road 
and water do not carry the expected signs, but they are not statistically different from zero. 
Improvement over accessibility of education has a sizeable and statistically significant impact 
on trust (a 20% increase in odds). The result may suggest that the public have only partial 
understanding of or information on the details of the reform.  
Turning to the determinants of trust in the new institution in 2007 after controlling for 
the baseline the chief’s (the third and the fourth rows in Table 1), the only major difference is 
that the statistical significance of the factor corruption disappears. The substantive effects of 
both corruption and voice factors also decrease. The reduction is expected as a similar set of 
factors could explain trust in chieftaincy. Without taking the baseline effects (on both 
dependent and independent variables) into account runs the risk of overestimating the 
importance of those factors to trust in the new institution. The differencing strategy also helps 
to eliminate bias induced by omitted variables that contain similarly explanatory power in 
explaining political trust in different institutions. It should be noted that differencing changes 
the interpretation of the variables. Now, kCorrupt indicates how much cleaner the local 
councils are relative to the chiefs, kVoice how much more willing the local councillors listen 
to their people, and tPublic Goods how much more accessible public services becomes 
relative to 2005. The changes in interpretation explain why the sizes of the odds 
corresponding to kCorrupt and tPublic Goods become greater than one. Regarding the 
substantive effect of the Voice variable, if a local council is considered to be more willing to 
listen to their people, the odds that the institution is of perceived to be more trustworthy than 
the chief are 43% higher. On the other hand, the effects of corruption and public goods 
16 
 
provision become negligible and statistically insignificant. Similar results hold when we 
disaggregate the indicator of public goods provision into its constitutive components.   
 Finally, the results obtained from the difference-in-difference method are similar to 
what we have seen so far. Only the estimates for the coefficient of the voice variables are 
found to be statistically and substantively significant, with the odds ratio of about 72% higher 
(last row). Yet, this finding is based on a much smaller sample because quite some 
respondents answered that it was too early to comment on the performance of the new 
government in the 2005 survey. Furthermore, unlike in the previous two cases, the odds ratios 
are less stable and vary from 72% to 89%. The variation is possibly due to the fact that the 
dependent variable now has more categories than before (six versus four), and the top-most 
category has a smaller baseline probability. As explained in the previous section, due to a 
major limitation on data availability, this set of results is based on the assumptions that 
people’s perceptions on chiefs were fairly stable between 2005 and 2007. However, unless 
trust in chief and perception on the level of corruption among chiefs dramatically improve 
within the period, based on this limited difference-in-difference design, the finding that the 
voice variable is a strong predictor of political trust is likely to be held.  
Overall, my investigation only finds sufficient supportive evidence to Hypothesis 1, 
which states that increase in influence in the policy-making process is a strong determinant of 
political trust towards the new institution in post-conflict Sierra Leone. While both perception 
on corruption and accessibility of public goods have the hypothesised effects, their effects are 
much smaller and less certain.  
 
Robustness Checks 
Apart from using different designs and models, several additional checks were 
performed to ensure the robustness of the major findings. The first check is to apply an 
alternative coding scheme on the variables kVoice and ktVoice. Rather than combining 
two categories (i.e. both parties are equally willing and equally not willing to listen to the 
people) into one category, I treated them as two distinct categories. Similar results were 
found. Second, I also use a less strict coding rule in coding political trust in 2005, hence the 
ktTrust variable. Again, similar results were obtained. Third, to check against the 
proportional odds assumption underlying the ordinal logit model, I employed an 
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unconstrained partial proportional odds model to re-estimate models (6) and (11), the new 
models yielded similar results. Finally, I tried alternative coding rule on some control 
variables and included additional controls. More specifically, in coding the assets variable, 
rather than assigning an equal weight to assets like generator and ratio, I separate generator, 
motor, and TV from other goods and have two indicators of asset.6 I also used a stricter 
standard to code the victimisation index by excluding the experience of refugee and fleeing in 
the construct. Lastly, I included the following additional controls: urban/ rural dummy, square 
of age (to capture nonlinear effect of age), distance to major cities (to proxy economic 
development of the chiefdom; see Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson, 2014), whether the 
respondent is living with a household member from the ruling family (to account for the 
possible loss of political power).7 None of these changes and additions has any significant 
impact on the key findings.  
 
Conclusion 
 The concept of political trust is connected to the field of peace research in various 
ways. Political trust is not only associated with the onset of civil war, but also the stability of 
negotiated settlement, the success of state building, and the spell of peace. Like other post-
conflict state building projects, decentralisation reform in Sierra Leone encountered, and is 
still encountering, a substantial amount of mistrust from the public. Fortunately, Sierra Leone 
has survived through the process. Characterised by a low level of political trust in new 
institutions, the case of Sierra Leone presents a unique opportunity to understand how 
political trust can be built. Three mechanisms were examined in this study: political integrity, 
political participation, and public goods provision. It is found that political participation in the 
form of giving citizens a voice in the policy making process has the most promising effect in 
building political trust in post-conflict Sierra Leone. By contrast, though corruption and 
improvement in public goods provision carry the proposed effects, the effects are more 
uncertain and short of substantive effects.  
                                                            
6 My main findings are not sensitive to the aggregation, probably because about half of the households own 
none of  the above. Those who own cheaper  items would not own  those expensive  items anyway and  those 
who own the expensive items would own most of the cheaper goods. In fact, only about 1% of the household 
fall under the intermediate cases of owning five or six items. 
7 According to the custom established since colonisation, paramount chiefs must come from the ruling families 
recognised by British colonial authority (Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson, 2014). 
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 These findings have important implications for the state building literature. The US 
government has changed their state building strategies from enforcing marketisation and 
democratisation to winning hearts and minds by improving public goods provision to civilians 
(Berman, Shapiro & Felter, 2011; Lake, 2010). My findings suggest that, though enhancement 
of public services may carry other strategic or normative values, if trust is considered to be a 
crucial step in state building, the strategy is unlikely to be effective in state building through 
the trust channel. Listening and responding to the locals are the most effective ways of 
restoring trust and peace. 
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Table I: Determinants of Trust in Local Councils, in Odds Ratio 
Note: + See Tables AI-AIII in the Appendix for full model specification. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
 DV: Trust  Independent Variable  
           
Description+ Institution Year Corrupt Voice Public Goods Health Road Water Education Markets 
           
Model (3) Local 2007 0.771*** 2.119*** 0.996      
           
           
Model (5) Local 2007 0.771*** 2.091***  0.911* 1.029 1.035 0.796** 0.999 
           
           
   kCorrupt kVoice tPublic Goods tHealth tRoad tWater tEducation tMarkets 
           
Model (8) Diff. 2007 1.022 1.432*** 1.013      
           
           
Model (10) Diff. 2007 1.025 1.429***  1.012 0.977 1.116* 1.011 0.960 
          
          
    ktVoice       
           
Model (13) Diff. Diff. 0.906 1.893*** 1.020      
           
           
Model (15) Diff. Diff. 0.936 1.718***  1.085 0.992 0.962 1.010 0.934 
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Appendix 
Table AI: Determinants of Trust in Local Councils in 2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trust Logit 3L Logit 3L Logit 2L Logit 3L Logit 
      
Corrupt -0.248*** -0.310*** -0.261*** -0.258*** -0.260*** 
 (0.074) (0.069) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) 
Voice 0.691*** 0.570*** 0.751*** 0.720*** 0.738*** 
 (0.154) (0.140) (0.167) (0.165) (0.168) 
Public goods -0.031 0.003 -0.004 -0.016  
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)  
Health     -0.093* 
     (0.053) 
Road     0.028 
     (0.055) 
Water     0.035 
     (0.095) 
Education     -0.229** 
     (0.113) 
Market     -0.001 
     (0.051) 
Age 0.003  0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Migrant 0.233  0.264 0.263 0.250 
 (0.172)  (0.187) (0.186) (0.189) 
Female 0.173  0.158 0.180 0.142 
 (0.127)  (0.135) (0.134) (0.135) 
Victimization 0.099**  0.067 0.071 0.064 
 (0.048)  (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) 
Assets -0.031  -0.043 -0.037 -0.062 
 (0.067)  (0.071) (0.071) (0.073) 
ELF -0.265  -0.370 -0.190 -0.523 
 (0.361)  (0.506) (0.483) (0.513) 
Diamond -0.030***  -0.021 -0.028* -0.018 
 (0.012)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Constant -0.703* -0.149 -0.604 -0.651 0.761 
 (0.388) (0.260) (0.437) (0.423) (0.741) 
var (council) - 0.125 0.115 - 0.108 
  (0.079) (0.084)  (0.082) 
var (chief) - 0.267*** 0.242** 0.324*** 0.244** 
  (0.103) (0.107) (0.120) (0.109) 
      
# Local council - 16 12 - 12 
# Chief - 142 136 136 136 
LR test (p-value) ^ - 0.0067 0.0193 - 0.0297 
Observations 1,268 1,643 1,268 1,268 1,268 
      
Note: ^ Test between two- and three-level multilevel logit models. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table AII: Determinants of Trust in Local Councils in 2007 after Differencing Across 
Institutions 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
kTrust O. Logit 2L O. Logit 2L O. Logit 3L O. Logit 2L O. Logit 
      
kCorrupt 0.001 0.113* 0.022 0.017 0.024 
 (0.069) (0.066) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
kVoice 0.399*** 0.237** 0.359*** 0.358*** 0.357*** 
 (0.130) (0.117) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) 
tPublic goods 0.010 -0.006 0.013 0.010  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)  
tHealth     0.012 
     (0.050) 
tRoad     -0.023 
     (0.038) 
tWater     0.110* 
     (0.066) 
tEducation     0.011 
     (0.045) 
tMarket     -0.041 
     (0.048) 
Age 0.004  0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Migrant 0.282  0.352* 0.349* 0.363* 
 (0.173)  (0.188) (0.188) (0.189) 
Female 0.143  0.141 0.143 0.145 
 (0.125)  (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
Victimization 0.033  0.030 0.030 0.029 
 (0.047)  (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
Assets 0.056  0.019 0.017 0.014 
 (0.066)  (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
ELF -0.155  -0.252 -0.153 -0.247 
 (0.358)  (0.504) (0.523) (0.510) 
Diamond -0.027**  -0.026 -0.027 -0.025 
 (0.011)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Threshold 1 -1.094*** -1.583*** -1.261*** -1.241*** -1.358*** 
 (0.298) (0.136) (0.335) (0.344) (0.366) 
Threshold 2 0.856*** 0.600*** 0.850** 0.870** 0.762** 
 (0.297) (0.129) (0.333) (0.343) (0.363) 
Threshold 3 3.092*** 2.847*** 3.224*** 3.246*** 3.140*** 
 (0.324) (0.168) (0.359) (0.369) (0.387) 
      
var (council) - - - 0.070 - 
    (0.068)  
var (chief) - 0.415*** 0.406*** 0.343*** 0.419*** 
  (0.118) (0.127) (0.122) (0.130) 
      
# Local council - 16 - 12 - 
# Chief - 136 130 130 130 
LR test (p-value) ^ - 0.0555 0.1454 - 0.1172 
Observations 949 1,227 949 949 949 
      
Note: ^ Test between two- and three-level multilevel ordinal logit models. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table AIII: Determinants of Trust in Local Councils (Difference-in-Difference) 
 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
ktTrust O. Logit 3L O. Logit 3L O. Logit 2L O. Logit 3L O. Logit 
      
kCorrupt -0.050 -0.027 -0.099 -0.066 -0.098 
 (0.086) (0.083) (0.091) (0.093) (0.091) 
ktVoice 0.517*** 0.451*** 0.638*** 0.540*** 0.637*** 
 (0.120) (0.107) (0.129) (0.127) (0.130) 
tPublic goods 0.020 -0.003 0.019 0.014  
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028)  
tHealth     0.073 
     (0.065) 
tRoad     0.010 
     (0.050) 
tWater     -0.051 
     (0.083) 
tHealth     -0.002 
     (0.061) 
tRoad     -0.065 
     (0.064) 
Age 0.002  0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Migrant 0.192  0.248 0.240 0.260 
 (0.239)  (0.251) (0.254) (0.251) 
Female 0.077  0.021 0.043 0.007 
 (0.170)  (0.177) (0.178) (0.178) 
Victimization 0.048  0.063 0.051 0.065 
 (0.064)  (0.071) (0.069) (0.072) 
Assets 0.011  -0.042 -0.014 -0.045 
 (0.091)  (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) 
ELF 0.220  -0.264 0.119 -0.289 
 (0.473)  (0.578) (0.562) (0.584) 
Diamond -0.031**  -0.004 -0.028 -0.005 
 (0.014)  (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
Threshold 1 -2.071*** -2.549*** -2.384*** -2.285*** -2.461*** 
 (0.436) (0.227) (0.491) (0.472) (0.518) 
Threshold 2 -0.838** -1.263*** -1.092** -1.000** -1.166** 
 (0.426) (0.202) (0.478) (0.458) (0.506) 
Threshold 3 0.306 -0.097 0.126 0.211 0.056 
 (0.423) (0.195) (0.471) (0.451) (0.499) 
Threshold 4 1.547*** 1.229*** 1.436*** 1.516*** 1.369*** 
 (0.427) (0.204) (0.474) (0.454) (0.501) 
Threshold 5 3.713*** 3.198*** 3.656*** 3.730*** 3.589*** 
 (0.505) (0.288) (0.545) (0.528) (0.568) 
      
var (council) - 0.172* 0.253 - 0.252 
  (0.102) (0.158)  (0.160) 
var (chief) - 0.094 0.092 0.276* 0.093 
  (0.106) (0.119) (0.160) (0.120) 
      
# Local council - 16 12 - 12 
# Chief - 129 121 121 121 
LR test (p-value) ^ - 0.0027 0.0016 - 0.0020 
Observation 492 640 492 492 492 
      
Note: ^ Test between two- and three-level multilevel ordinal logit models. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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